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In single-winner voting system theory, the Condorcet loser criterion (CLC) is a measure for differentiating voting systems. It implies the majority loser criterion but does not imply the Condorcet winner criterion.
A voting system complying with the Condorcet loser criterion will never allow a Condorcet loser to win. A Condorcet loser is a candidate who can be defeated in a head-to-head competition against each other candidate.[1] (Not all elections will have a Condorcet loser since it is possible for three or more candidates to be mutually defeatable in different head-to-head competitions.)
^https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.05911 "We say that an alternative is a Condorcet loser if it would be defeated by every other alternative in a kind of one-on-one contest that takes place in a sequential pairwise voting with a fixed agenda4.– Condorcet loser criterion (CLC), [...] we say that a social choice procedure satisfies the Condorcet loser criterion (CLC) provided that a Condorcet loser is never among the social choices."
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