Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses information

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD, pronounced /ˈsiː-æd/), also known in the United States as "Wild Weasel" and (initially) "Iron Hand" operations, are military actions to suppress enemy surface-based air defenses, including not only surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) but also interrelated systems such as early-warning radar and command, control and communication (C³) functions, while also marking other targets to be destroyed by an air strike. Suppression can be accomplished both by physically destroying the systems or by disrupting and deceiving them through electronic warfare. In modern warfare, SEAD missions can constitute as much as 30% of all sorties launched in the first week of combat and continue at a reduced rate through the rest of a campaign.^[1] One quarter of American combat sorties in recent conflicts have been SEAD missions.^[2] Despite generally being associated with aircraft, SEAD missions may be performed using any means, including through actions by ground forces.

In some contexts, Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (DEAD) is used to reference physical destruction of air defense targets, while SEAD applies to sorties which discourage enemy use of their air-defense radar assets out of fear of placing the assets in jeopardy.

Primitive operations akin to SEAD emerged during the Second World War, during which multiple participants made attempts to degrade enemy ground radar stations. However, SEAD missions performed by dedicated aircraft first undertook combat missions during the Vietnam War, the United States Air Force's EF-105F/F-105G Thunderchief and United States Navy's A-6B Intruder being amongst these pioneers; Operation Linebacker intentionally incorporated SEAD actions to improve the survivability of bombers and increase overall effectiveness. Other early conflicts that saw SEAD missions conducted included the 1982 Falklands War, over Port Stanley, and the 1982 Lebanon War, in the Beqaa Valley. The tactical awareness, or lack thereof, of air defense operators proved to be a decisive factor in the success rate of these missions. During the 1986 United States bombing of Libya, while Libya's integrated air defense network was not destroyed, it was damaged without major losses incurred by US forces.

During the 1990s, extensive use of SEAD was made, particularly during the Gulf War of the early 1990s. Intense aerial attacks of Iraq's integrated air defenses were conducted during Operation Instant Thunder, the Coalition's aerial attacks at the start of the conflict; Iraqi SAM operators regularly resorted to firing missiles with minimal or no guidance due to fears that radar use brought quick retaliation. All Iraqi air defenses in the south were destroyed, although the skies remained unsafe for low altitude flight. In the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the defender's air defences proved to be less vulnerable and more effective; although only two aircraft were reportedly lost to Yugoslavian SAMs, the downing of an F-117A Nighthawk marked the first combat loss ever of a stealth aircraft. In the Iraq War of the 2000s, coalition aircraft repeatedly targeted Iraqi SAMs during the opening phase of the conflict, despite this, aerial strikes were usually performed from stand-off distances to avoid these defenses, and low level flight was avoided. In the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, while many Ukrainian air defence facilities were reportedly destroyed or damaged in the first days of the war by Russian air strikes, Russia may not have been able to gain aerial superiority; it has been alleged that Ukrainian mid-range SAM sites have forced planes to fly low, but this makes them vulnerable to shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles.