Tacit collusion information

Tacit collusion is a collusion between competitors who do not explicitly exchange information but achieve an agreement about coordination of conduct.^[1] There are two types of tacit collusion: concerted action and conscious parallelism.^[2]^[3] In a concerted action also known as concerted activity,^[4] competitors exchange some information without reaching any explicit agreement, while conscious parallelism implies no communication.^[1]^[5] In both types of tacit collusion, competitors agree to play a certain strategy without explicitly saying so. It is also called oligopolistic price coordination^[6] or tacit parallelism.^[7]

A dataset of gasoline prices of BP, Caltex, Woolworths, Coles, and Gull from Perth gathered in the years 2001 to 2015 was used to show by statistical analysis the tacit collusion between these retailers.^[8] BP emerged as a price leader and influenced the behavior of the competitors. As result, the timing of price jumps became coordinated and the margins started to grow in 2010.

^ ^a ^b Harrington, Joseph E. (2012). "A theory of tacit collusion" (PDF). Retrieved 24 March 2021. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
^ Vaska, Michael K. (1985). "Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining the Boundary". University of Chicago Law Review. 52 (2): 508–535. doi:10.2307/1599667. JSTOR 1599667. Retrieved 27 March 2021.
^ Shulman, Daniel R. (2006–2007). "Matsushita and the Role of Economists with Regard to Proof of Conspiracy". Loyola University Chicago Law Journal. 38: 497. Retrieved 27 March 2021.
^ Buccirossi, Paolo (2008). "Facilitating practices" (PDF). Handbook of Antitrust Economics. 1: 305–351. Retrieved 27 March 2021.
^ Page, William H. (2007). "Communication and Concerted Action". Loyola University Chicago Law Journal. 38: 405. Retrieved 24 March 2021.
^ Fzrachi, Ariel; Stucke, Maurice E. (2019). "Sustainable and Unchallenged Algorithmic Tacit Collusion". Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property. 17: 217.
^ Markham, Jesse W. (1951). "The Nature and Significance of Price Leadership". The American Economic Review. 41 (5): 891–905. ISSN 0002-8282. JSTOR 1809090. Retrieved 25 April 2021.
^ Byrne, David P.; de Roos, Nicolas (23 July 2018). "Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline". Social Science Research Network. SSRN 2570637. Retrieved 25 March 2021. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)

[:1-1] Harrington, Joseph E. (2012). "A theory of tacit collusion" (PDF). Retrieved 24 March 2021. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)

[2] Vaska, Michael K. (1985). "Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining the Boundary". University of Chicago Law Review. 52 (2): 508–535. doi:10.2307/1599667. JSTOR 1599667. Retrieved 27 March 2021.

[:2-3] Shulman, Daniel R. (2006–2007). "Matsushita and the Role of Economists with Regard to Proof of Conspiracy". Loyola University Chicago Law Journal. 38: 497. Retrieved 27 March 2021.

[4] Buccirossi, Paolo (2008). "Facilitating practices" (PDF). Handbook of Antitrust Economics. 1: 305–351. Retrieved 27 March 2021.

[5] Page, William H. (2007). "Communication and Concerted Action". Loyola University Chicago Law Journal. 38: 405. Retrieved 24 March 2021.

[6] Fzrachi, Ariel; Stucke, Maurice E. (2019). "Sustainable and Unchallenged Algorithmic Tacit Collusion". Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property. 17: 217.

[7] Markham, Jesse W. (1951). "The Nature and Significance of Price Leadership". The American Economic Review. 41 (5): 891–905. ISSN 0002-8282. JSTOR 1809090. Retrieved 25 April 2021.

[8] Byrne, David P.; de Roos, Nicolas (23 July 2018). "Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline". Social Science Research Network. SSRN 2570637. Retrieved 25 March 2021. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)

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