A philosophical zombie (or "p-zombie") is a being in a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that is physically identical to a normal human being but does not have conscious experience.[1]
For example, if a philosophical zombie were poked with a sharp object, it would not feel any pain, but it would react exactly the way any conscious human would. Philosophical zombie arguments are used against forms of physicalism and in defense of the hard problem of consciousness, which is the problem of accounting in physical terms for subjective, intrinsic, first-person, what-it's-like-ness experiences. Proponents of philosophical zombie arguments, such as the philosopher David Chalmers, argue that since a philosophical zombie is by definition physically identical to a conscious person, even its logical possibility refutes physicalism. This is because it establishes the existence of conscious experience as a further fact.[2] Philosopher Daniel Stoljar points out that zombies need not be utterly without subjective states, and that even a subtle psychological difference between two physically identical people, such as how coffee tastes to them, is enough to refute physicalism.[3] Such arguments have been criticized by many philosophers. Some physicalists, such as Daniel Dennett, argue that philosophical zombies are logically incoherent and thus impossible, or that all humans are philosophical zombies;[4][5] others, such as Christopher Hill, argue that philosophical zombies are coherent but metaphysically impossible.[6]
^Kirk, Robert (2009). "Zombie". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009s ed.).
^Chalmers, D. (1996): The Conscious Mind, Oxford University Press, New York.
^Stoljar, Daniel (October 11, 2018). "The Epistemic Approach to the Mind-Body Problem. Daniel Stoljar". YouTube.
^Cite error: The named reference Dennett1991 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^Cite error: The named reference Dennett1995 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
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