Harrison Report information

The Harrison Report was a July 1945 report carried out by United States lawyer Earl G. Harrison, as U.S. representative to the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, into the conditions of the displaced persons camps in post-World War II Europe.^[1]

Harrison's report was part of the impetus for the creation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry regarding Mandatory Palestine, then under a British mandate, which was formed to recommend policies for dealing with both Jewish war refugees and the problems of Palestine.^[2]

Following the completion of the report, Truman sent a copy to British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, with respect to Britain’s responsibility for Palestine. Truman wrote "On the basis of this and other information which has come to me I concur in the belief that no other single matter is so important for those who have known the horrors of concentration camps for over a decade as is the future of immigration possibilities into Palestine."^[3]

The British responded negatively to the report; they blamed Zionist pressure for the report's conclusion regarding Palestine, and suggested that the United States should also take a share of the refugees.^[4] Attlee wanted the report kept confidential, but his request was ignored.^[5]

^ Robert L. Hilliard, "Surviving the Americans: The Continued Struggle of the Jews After Liberation" (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1997) p. 214
^ Stone, Dan (5 May 2015). The Liberation of the Camps: The End of the Holocaust and Its Aftermath. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-21603-5. In order to try and mitigate these fears and to alleviate some of the ill-will that was disrupting US– UK relations in the wake of the Harrison Report, in November 1945 the British government set up the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine (AACI) to investigate Harrison's claims.
^ JVL, 31 August 1945
^ Penkower, 2016, pages 56–58: "The official British response could be foretold. Truman’s 24 July request of Churchill had already set Near East specialist Beeley’s teeth on edge, indicating to him that the Zionists had been “deploringly successful in selling the idea” that, even after Allied victory, immigration to Palestine represented for many Jews “their only hope for survival.” Wishing to avoid a postwar influx of Jews into Palestine, the Foreign Office’s Refugee Department had expressed the fear in March 1944 that British trials of Germans on charges of crimes against humanity committed against Jews would convince survivors not to return to their native countries after the war. Whitehall’s expert on refugees, Ian Henderson, was convinced that the Zionists were behind Harrison’s recommendations. British military authorities in Germany rejected Harrison’s criticism, claiming that Jews were being treated exactly like all other displaced persons... In Bevin’s mind, Harrison’s report was “not based on real investigation.” Bevin told Weizmann that Truman was merely trying to gain votes by his stance; the United States had to take its share of those Jews who must be removed from Europe."
^ Haron 1986, pp. 28–29.

[1] Robert L. Hilliard, "Surviving the Americans: The Continued Struggle of the Jews After Liberation" (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1997) p. 214

[Stone-2] Stone, Dan (5 May 2015). The Liberation of the Camps: The End of the Holocaust and Its Aftermath. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-21603-5. In order to try and mitigate these fears and to alleviate some of the ill-will that was disrupting US– UK relations in the wake of the Harrison Report, in November 1945 the British government set up the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine (AACI) to investigate Harrison's claims.

[3] JVL, 31 August 1945

[4] Penkower, 2016, pages 56–58: "The official British response could be foretold. Truman’s 24 July request of Churchill had already set Near East specialist Beeley’s teeth on edge, indicating to him that the Zionists had been “deploringly successful in selling the idea” that, even after Allied victory, immigration to Palestine represented for many Jews “their only hope for survival.” Wishing to avoid a postwar influx of Jews into Palestine, the Foreign Office’s Refugee Department had expressed the fear in March 1944 that British trials of Germans on charges of crimes against humanity committed against Jews would convince survivors not to return to their native countries after the war. Whitehall’s expert on refugees, Ian Henderson, was convinced that the Zionists were behind Harrison’s recommendations. British military authorities in Germany rejected Harrison’s criticism, claiming that Jews were being treated exactly like all other displaced persons... In Bevin’s mind, Harrison’s report was “not based on real investigation.” Bevin told Weizmann that Truman was merely trying to gain votes by his stance; the United States had to take its share of those Jews who must be removed from Europe."

[FOOTNOTEHaron198628–29-5] Haron 1986, pp. 28–29.

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