Global InformationAlbutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation information
| Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation | |
|---|---|
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| Court | Constitutional Court of South Africa |
| Full case name | Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Others |
| Decided | 23 February 2010 |
| Docket nos. | CCT 54/09 |
| Citation(s) | [2010] ZACC 4; 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC); 2010 (2) SACR 101 (CC); 2010 (5) BCLR 391 (CC) |
| Case history | |
| Appealed from | High Court of South Africa, North Gauteng Division – Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2009] ZAGPPHC 35 |
| Court membership | |
| Judges sitting | Ngcobo CJ, Moseneke DCJ, Cameron J, Froneman J, Khampepe J, Mogoeng J, Nkabinde J, Skweyiya J and van der Westhuizen J |
| Case opinions | |
| Decision by | Ngcobo CJ (unanimous) |
| Concurrence | Froneman J (Cameron and Froneman concurring) |
Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Others is a 2010 decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa which concerned a special presidential dispensation to pardon the perpetrators of politically motivated crimes committed during the apartheid era. The Constitutional Court held that the President of South Africa had contravened the Constitution in deciding not to consult the victims of those crimes before granting the pardons. The unanimous judgment was written by Chief Justice Sandile Ngcobo and delivered on 23 February 2010.
The Albutt judgment was notable for implicitly expanding the scope of rationality review to include the process by which organs of state take decisions – in this case, to include the relationship between the objectives of the special dispensation and the factors that the President considered in deciding how to use his constitutional power of pardon. By this method, the court found that the principle of rationality may confer upon organs of state a duty to consult, regardless of whether such a duty arises separately from the requirement that administrative action must be procedurally fair.