Global InformationRussian information war against Ukraine information
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The Russian information war against Ukraine was articulated by the Russian government as part of the Gerasimov doctrine.[1][2][3] They believed that Western governments were instigating color revolutions in former Soviet states which posed a threat to Russia.[4]
The concept of "informatsionnaya voyna" (Russian: информационная война, lit. 'informational war') encompasses various strategies, including cyberwarfare, often described as technical defenses against technical attacks in warfare.[5] However, cyberwarfare is just one aspect of Russia's information war, which may include controlling undersea communications cables, shaping national narratives, manipulating the news cycle, and flooding the information space with Russian bots and trolls. The goal is to achieve strategic victory and exert reflexive control.[6][7] These efforts were used as part of its disinformation in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Due to effective censorship, most media outlets in Russia are government-controlled, allowing Kremlin messaging to successfully sway the citizens of the Russian Federation to support its approach in Ukraine.[8] The Kremlin has denied waging war in Ukraine, claiming it only wants to protect Russian speakers against Ukrainian Nazis.[9] This narrative has been reinforced by Russian television since 2014, giving it an advantage through repetition and familiarity.[10] According to a recent poll, 58 percent of Russians approved of this perspective between February 28 and March 3.[10]
During the ongoing Russian invasion, Ukraine's online propaganda largely focuses on its heroes and martyrs, using their stories to emphasize Ukrainian fortitude and Russian aggression.[11] Additionally, Ukraine's strategy includes employing comedy[12] and promoting skepticism towards Russian narratives.[13][14]
- ^ Gerasimov, Valery (2013). "The value of science in prediction" (PDF). Military Review. Vol. 27. Military-Industrial Kurier.
- ^ Galeotti, Mark (2018). "The mythical 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and the language of threat". Critical Studies on Security. 7 (2): 157–161. doi:10.1080/21624887.2018.1441623. S2CID 159811828.
- ^ "I'm Sorry for Creating the 'Gerasimov Doctrine'". Foreign Policy. 5 March 2018. Retrieved 6 March 2018.
- ^ What Is the ‘Technology of the Colour Revolutions,’ and Why Does It Occupy Such a Prominent Place in Russian Threat Perceptions?, Mitchell Binding. Canadian Military Journal, Volume 19, Number 4, Autumn 2019
- ^ [Russia's Information Warfare: Exploring the Cognitive Dimension], Blagovest Tashev, PhD; Lieutenant Colonel Michael Purcell (Ret); and Major Brian McLaughlin (Ret). Marine Corps University, MCU Journal vol. 10, no. 2, Fall 2019 https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.2019100208 p.133
- ^ Stukal, Denis; Sanovich, Sergey; Bonneau, Richard; Tucker, Joshua A. (February 2022). "Why Botter: How Pro-Government Bots Fight Opposition in Russia" (PDF). American Political Science Review. 116 (1). Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political Science Association: 843–857. doi:10.1017/S0003055421001507. ISSN 1537-5943. LCCN 08009025. OCLC 805068983. S2CID 247038589. Retrieved 10 March 2022.
- ^ Gilles, Keir. "Handbook of Russian Information Warfare. Fellowship Monograph 9. NATO Defense College ISBN 978-88-96898-16-1 p.4" (PDF).
- ^
Manjoo, Farhad (March 2, 2022). "Opinion: Putin No Longer Seems Like a Master of Disinformation". The New York Times. Archived from the original on November 25, 2022. Retrieved November 14, 2022.
{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link) - ^ Putin says he will 'denazify' Ukraine. Here's the history behind that claim, Miriam Berger. Washington Post, February 24, 2022
- ^ a b Don’t Sleep on Russian Information-War Capabilities: Indeed, the Ukraine invasion should galvanize U.S. investment in its own messaging infrastructure, Alyssa Demus and Christopher Paul. Defense One, April 5, 2022
- ^
"Fact and Mythmaking Blend in Ukraine's Information War". The New York Times. March 3, 2022. Retrieved March 24, 2022.
The claims by Ukraine do not compare to the falsehoods being spread by Russia...Instead, Ukraine's online propaganda is largely focused on its heroes and martyrs, characters who help dramatize tales of Ukrainian fortitude and Russian aggression.
- ^ As bombs fall on Ukraine, memes ridicule Russian aggression: People hiding from violence in subterranean shelters exchange jokes on their phones as a release from the darkness, Mansur Mirovalev. Al Jazeera, 10 Mar 2022
- ^ Aliaksandrau, Andrei (December 15, 2014). "Brave new war: The information war between Russia and Ukraine". Index on Censorship. 43 (4): 54–60. doi:10.1177/0306422014560963. S2CID 145000133.
Ukrainian bloggers, social media activists and journalists are educating their audiences on how to identify fakes.
- ^ Szostek, Joanna (2017). "Nothing Is True? The Credibility of News and Conflicting Narratives during "Information War" in Ukraine". The International Journal of Press/Politics. 23: 116–135. doi:10.1177/1940161217743258. S2CID 148835708. Retrieved March 24, 2022.
The closeup study of news consumption in Ukraine at a time of 'information war' shows that individuals judge the credibility of narratives based on whether issues that matter to them are addressed, not only on whether particular 'facts' are likely to be genuine.